Datawocky

Reboot: How to Reinvent a Technology Startup

Three years ago, Odeo was a struggling startup on a path to nowhere. Odeo's core offering--a set of tools for users to create, record and share podcasts--was facing serious competition from Apple and other heavyweights. The management team made a radical decision to "reboot" the company, and Twitter was born.

As I read the Twitter story, narrated eloquently by Dom Sagolla, I can't help but look back over the many startups that I've been associated with over the past twelve years.  In my various roles as a founder, an investor, a board member, and an advisor to startups in Silicon Valley, I'm constantly fascinated by the mechanics of reinvention. Which approaches to reinvention succeed and which ones fail?

Startups flounder for countless reasons. Perhaps the market opportunity is not as big as imagined, or perhaps there is a mismatch between the technology and the market. Maybe the world changed in some significant way, invalidating the key assumptions on which the startup was based. For example, an established company such as Google or Microsoft might enter the market. Or perhaps the deepest recession in recent history dried up demand for the original product or service. In these cases, the founders and management team have to ask themselves the question: should we push ahead, assuming superior execution will win the day against long odds? Or should we change what we're doing? 

Companies that decide to reinvent need to acknowledge the bad news first: most startups fail, even the reincarated ones.  Those are just the odds. The good news is that certain approaches to reinvention work better than others, and companies can increase their chance of success by carefully calculating their reboot strategy.

Every technology startup has four core components: team, technology/product, market, and business model. Rebooting involves changing at least one of these components, while leaving the other factors unchanged. Let us look at each component in turn:

1. Team. Reinvention usually leads to changes in the team. To qualify as a reboot rather than an entirely new company, however, there must be at least part of the team -- and usually at least one of the founding members -- who continues to remain with the company through the transition. In my experience, one model that usually does not work is when VC investors replace the entire founding team with new management. I've never seen a startup with none of its founders remaining succeed.

2. Market. Many startups try the most tempting option: to keep the same technology/product and look for a new market.  After all, the investment in product development has already been made.  Unfortunately, while this approach seems the most logical, it is also the least likely to succeed. Why? The hardest part of a startup is understanding the requirements of the market, not building the product. After the dot-com bust in 2000, many consumer internet startups tried to reinvent themselves as enterprise technology providers (remember Chemdex?). The startup junkyard is littered with the carcasses of dot-coms that took this route and failed.

3. Business Model. A very attractive strategy is to keep the same product and market, but change the business model. In my experience, this is the most likely option to succeed. For example, enterprise software companies can reinvent themselves by open-sourcing their software and providing consulting services, or a premium version. A software vendor can reboot as a software as a service (SaaS) provider on the Web. Consumer websites can move to a subscription model from an advertising model, or vice versa.

4. Product. Another smart reinvention approach is to addressing the same market (or a closely related one), but change the product or the business model. This option works best when the market need is real, but the product does not adequately address the opportunity. I've found that the key to success is to throw away the old product completely and start from scratch, using the hard-won learnings about the market acquired from the first iteration. In some cases, it makes sense to move the old product to "maintenance mode" and reassign the bulk of the team to developing the new product.

I've applied this particular model of reinvention to both companies where I have been a founder -- Junglee in 1997 and Kosmix ten years later, in 2007.

We started Junglee in 1996 to create virtual databases that integrated data from multiple websites. Although we had some initial success, we quickly realized that the architecture of our first product limited our ability to deal with rapidly-changing information, a key success factor in certain markets. We completely rebuilt the product from scratch in 1997, and created the world's first comparison shopping service.  This service was enormously popular and led to Junglee's acquisition by Amazon.com in 1998.

We introduced Kosmix as a vertical search engine, initially in the health sector.  Our idea was to find a better way to help users understand open-ended queries such as "diabetes", which have no single right answer; that is, explore topics rather than find the needle in the haystack. We'd planned to take a vertical-by-vertical strategy, launching sites named RightHealth, RightAutos and RightTrips. Very soon, however, we realized that the vertical approach carries severe limitations, because it's hard for consumers to remember to go to different sites for different topics of interest. We decided to rewrite the product from scratch, and we relaunched Kosmix.com as a horizontal site.  Kosmix lets you explore any topic and gives you a 360 degree view of anything than interests you -- including information from the Deep Web that is inaccessible to the usual search engines. This transition from vertical to horizontal was much harder than it sounds; it required us to rewrite our technology from scratch. But we did it because of our passionate belief that the problem is real and the market opportunity is vast.

While most startup reboots involve rethinking only one or two of the four core components, in some rare cases it makes sense to go the whole hog. Sometimes it pays to be bold: go after an entirely new market opportunity, create a new product, find a new business model, and make large-scale team changes. This approach is fraught with risk; but there have been a couple of spectacular successes. One clear example is Twitter. Another is Twitter's cousin SMS GupShup, a similar service in India. SMS GupShup was born as Webaroo, a company that wanted to create offline copies of large parts of the web so you could browse while offline. A couple of engineers there launched the SMS GupShup service as a lark and it took off; once the management team saw the traction of GupShup, they re-oriented the company around the new idea.

Some startups are born great: the right team starts with the right idea at the right time, and the rest is history. Some have greatness thrust upon them: the right conjunction of market forces propels an unlikely startup to dizzying heights. Other startups, not so lucky as those in the first two categories, need to earn their greatness. And sometimes that requires a reboot.

For Startups, Survival is not a Strategy

Note: As I was working on this post, I ran into Om Malik and showed him a draft. He liked it and asked to post it simultaneously on GigaOM. If you've read it on GigaOM, you can skip reading it here.

In these perilous economic times, the layoff memos often follow a familiar refrain: We have cut costs by 20%. That gives us an additional year's runway. Or two. Yes, startups can cut costs and thereby survive for longer. But just because they can, does not mean they should.

Let me state at the very outset that this article applies only to venture-backed startups, which are a small minority of businesses in the economy. The sole purpose of most businesses is to create a steady income stream for their owners and operators. Venture-backed startups, on the other hand, are created with the sole purpose of leading to a meaningful exit for founders, investors, and employees. Such an exit might be either an IPO or an acquisition.

The raison d' etre for such startups is therefore a successful exit, not mere survival. And the lifeblood of any startup is growth. Growth along some dimension: customers, usage, revenues, or profits. Under most economic conditions, an IPO is impossible without revenue and profit growth  -- and we are unlikely to see a return soon of the times when it was. From an acquisition point of view, stagnant companies are valued at low multiples of revenue -- say 1x to 2x. The comparables are utilities.

A popular meme suggests that "flat is the new up." Given the downturn in the economy, the argument goes, even keeping revenues flat is sufficient. This argument, however, does not apply to startups. By definition, startups are supposed to be attacking nascent market opportunities and unsaturated markets, and so should be able to grow even through a downturn. If a startup cannot find growth in this environment, it's a clear message that the market opportunity might be better served by an established company. Of course, growth in profits or revenues are way better than growth just in usage; but even growth in usage is better than stagnation on all three fronts. There is at least the possibility that a company with strong usage growth might one day be attractive to an acquirer with a good monetization engine.

From a subjective point of view, it's no fun to work at a startup that is not growing along some dimension. Growth is necessary for everyone to enjoy the experience, and feel they are accomplishing something. Stagnation leads to low morale, and people sit around waiting for the axe to fall. It's a slow, agonizing way to die. Rather than let the company become a zombie, management would be doing their investors and employees a favor by advocating in such cases that they pull the plug on the company and return the remaining capital to investors.

Why VCs don’t put the zombies out of their misery

Founders and executives have a lot of emotional capital invested in their companies, and so it is understandable that they shy away from making the ultimate decision. However, the surprising thing is that VCs often allow the zombies to survive for far too long. The reason for this is a subtle misalignment of interests between VCs and their investors. As long as a startup is still alive, VCs can carry the company on their books at the valuation set by the last round of financing. Once they pull the plug, the fund will receive pennies on the dollar, a loss that has to be recorded on the books and doesn't look good when the firm goes to raise their next fund. That’s why every VC portfolio has its fair share of zombies.

Another contributing factor is excessive preference overhangs. Investors receive preferred stock with the right to get back their invested capital ahead of common shareholders in an exit; in some cases they have the right receive a multiple of their invested capital ahead of common shareholders. The total amount that investors need to receive before common shareholders can participate in an exit is called the "preference overhang." 

If a company has raised so much capital that any realistic acquisition will be below the overhang, then common shareholders stand to receive nothing from the sale; and so company management has no incentive to look for such an exit. In such cases, it's important for the VCs and management to agree to restructure the preference overhangs to make such exits attractive to management. Otherwise the company is destined to become a zombie.

Every startup founder and employee has to consider three possible outcomes. Success, failure, and zombiehood. Success is much better than failure, but quick failure beats wasting years of your life on a zombie. If you are a company founder, and you are considering layoffs to extend the runway (perhaps on the advice of your venture investor), you should look at yourself in the mirror and ask whether you are cutting away your growth opportunity and just choosing a lingering death over a quick one.

The Real Long Tail: Why both Chris Anderson and Anita Elberse are Wrong

A new study by Anita Elberse, published in the Harvard Business Review, raises questions about the validity of Chris Anderson's Long Tail theory. If you're related to Rip Van Winkle, the Long Tail theory suggests that the dramatically lower distribution costs for media (such as music and movies) enabled by the internet has the potential to reshape the demand curve for media. Traditionally, these businesses have been hits-driven, with the majority of revenue and profits being attributable to a small number of items (the hits). Anderson argues that the internet's ability to serve niches cost-effectively increases the demand for items further down the "tail" of the demand curve, making the aggregate demand for the tail comparable to that for the head.

Anderson's insight resonated instantly with the digerati. It is said that Helen of Troy's face launched a thousand ships; the Long Tail theory certainly launched more than a thousand startups, all with an obligatory Long Tail slide in their investor pitches. Recently, however, there has been a creeping suspicion that the data don't support the theory; the backlash has been spearheaded, among others, by Lee Gomes of the Wall Street Journal. In her piece, Anita Elberse does a deep dive into the data and concludes that the Long Tail theory is flawed.

Anderson has posted a rebuttal on his blog, pointing out a problem with Elberse's analysis: defining the head and tail in percentage terms. There is some truth to Anderson's rebuttal. But the heart of Elberse's criticism lies not in the definition of the head and the tail. It's in using McPhee's theory of exposure to conclude that positive feedback effects reinforce the popularity of hits, while dooming items in the tail to perpetual obscurity. She presents data from Quickflix, an Australian movie rentals service showing that movies in the tail are rated on average lower than movies in the head. Thus, movies in the tail are destined to remain in the tail. Elberse exhorts media executives to concentrate their resources on backing a small set of potential blockbusters, rather than fritter it away on niches.

The big problem with this argument is that it conflates cause and effect. Before the internet, distribution was expensive, and there was no way for consumers to provide instant feedback on products. Consumers then got little choice in the matter of what items were readily available and what items were hard to find. Thus, the hits were picked by a few studio executives, publishers, or record producers who "greenlighted" projects they thought had hit potential. But when distribution is cheap, and consumer feedback loops are in place, the items that a lot of consumers like become popular and move into the head. It's not that items in the tail are inherently rated lower; items are in the tail precisely because they are rated lower.

It's as if we're comparing two systems of government, a hereditary aristocracy and a democracy, by comparing the sizes of the ruling elite in the two cases. That misses the point entirely. What matters is not the size of the ruling elite, it's how they got there. So, the big change wrought by the internet is not so much to change the shape of the demand curve for media products, as Anderson claims; nor has there been no change whatsoever, as Elberse posits. The big change is not in what fraction of the demand is in the head, it's in how the items that are in the head got there in the first place. Any change in the shape of the curve itself is incidental.

There's another market where we are seeing this phenomenon play out: the market for Facebook (and MySpace) apps. In earlier years, it took a lot of capital to get a company off the ground. The companies that got funded were the ones with good business plans who could convince VCs to take the plunge based on the people, the plan, and potentially some intellectual property. But it doesn't take much capital to write a Facebook app, leading to a proliferation of them. This paves the way for the expected inversion. Facebook users don't use the apps that VCs fund. Instead, Facebook users decide which apps they like, and VCs fund the ones, such as Slide and RockYou, that gain popularity.

It is instructive to look at the Facebook app trends study published by Roger Margoulas and Ben Lorica at O'Reilly Research. The study shows that at last count, there were close to 30,000 facebook apps. Usage, however, is highly concentrated among the top few apps, a classic example of a hits-driven industry (see graph) -- no long tail. However, these hits have been produced by the collective action of millions of Facebook users, rather than by a small set of savvy media executives. And there's a lot of churn: new applications join the winners and old winners die and are buried in the tail.

The real Long Tail created by the internet is not the long tail of consumption, but the long tail of influence. Earlier, the ability to influence the decisions on who the winners and losers were rested with a few media executives. Now every social network user has some potential influence, however small, on the result. The long tail of influence, combined with instant feedback loops, leads to a short tail of consumption. The Facebook app market is a leading indicator of the path the entire media industry will take in years to come.

Update: Chris Anderson has posted a rebuttal in the Comments. Thanks Chris! Please do read his comment and my response. Chris points out that Facebook apps still follow a power law distribution. It doesn't matter how long the tail is, what matters is how heavy it is. The area under the long tail is a function of both length and depth, and depends crucially on the power law exponent. For the mathematically minded, the details are here.

Angel, VC, or Bootstrap?

Note: I wrote this piece a couple of weeks back, inspired by Greg Linden's blog post (see below). Inc then picked up the piece and asked me not to publish it until it appeared on the Inc website. The article appears on the Inc website today with some minor edits.

Greg Linden was one of the key developers behind Amazon's famous recommendations system -- the system that recommends books, movies, and other products to Amazon customers based on their purchase history. He subsequently went to Stanford and picked up an MBA. In January 2004, he launched a startup named Findory to provide everyone with a personalized online newspaper. You cannot imagine anyone who could be more qualified to make a startup like this a success. Yet Findory shut down in November 2007. In a brilliant post-mortem, Greg says his big mistake was to bootstrap his company while trying to raise funding from venture capital firms; he just couldn't convince them to invest. He should have raised his funding from angel investors instead.

This is an important decision every startup founder has to make -- where to raise their funding. The three viable sources at the very early stages of a company are:

• Friends and family. Yourself, if you can afford it.
• Angel investors. Usually wealthy individuals, but includes outfits such as Y Combinator. (My firm Cambrian Ventures is also in this category, although we are currently not actively seeking investments; we're too busy running our own company Kosmix.)
• Venture Capital (VC).

To understand which option is best for your startup, you need to understand how investors evaluate companies. While investors evaluate companies across a range of criteria, three that stay consistent are: Team, Technology, and Market. Angels and VCs evaluate them in different ways. Here's how.

How Venture Capitalists Evaluate Startups

• Market. Venture Capitalists want to invest in companies that produce meaningful returns in the context of their fund size, which typically is in the hundreds of millions of dollars. To interest a VC firm, a company needs to be attacking a large market opportunity. If you cannot make a credible case that your startup idea will lead to a company with at least $100 million in revenue within 4-5 years, then a VC is not the right fit for you. It's often OK to use consumer traction as a substitute for market opportunity -- many VCs will accept a large and rapidly growing user base as sufficient proof that there is a potentially large market opportunity.

• Team. Venture Capitalists use simple pattern matching to classify teams into two buckets. A founding team is deemed "backable" if it includes one or more seasoned executives from successful or fashionable companies (such as Google) or entrepreneurs whose track record includes a least one past hit. Otherwise the team is considered "non-backable."

• Technology. Venture Capitalists are not always great at evaluating technology. To them, technology is either a risk (the team claims their technology can do X; is that really true?) or an entry barrier (is the technology hard enough to develop to prevent too many competitors from entering the market?) If your startup is developing a nontrivial technology, it helps to have someone on the team who is a recognized expert in the technology area -- either as a founder or as an outside advisor.

Here's the rule of thumb: to qualify for VC financing, you need to pass the Market Opportunity test and at least one of the other two tests. Either you have a backable team, or you have nontrivial technology that can act as an entry barrier.

How Angels Evaluate Startups

There are many kinds of angels, but I recommend picking only one kind: someone who has been a successful entrepreneur and has a deep interest in the market you are attacking or the technology you are developing. Other kinds of angels are usually not very high value. Here's how angels evaluate the three investment criteria:

• Market. It's all right if the market is unproven, but both the team and the angel have to believe that within a few months, the company can reach a point where it can either credibly show a large market opportunity (and thus attract VC funding), or develop technology valuable enough to be acquired by an established company.

• Team. The team needs to include someone the angel knows and respects from a prior life.

• Technology. The technology is something the angel has prior expertise in and is comfortable evaluating without all the dots connected.

Here's the angel rule of thumb: you need to pass any 2 out of the 3 tests (team/technology, technology/market, or team/market). I have funded all 3 of these combinations, resulting in either subsequent VC financing (e.g., Aster Data, Efficient Frontier,  TheFind), or quick acquisitions (Transformic, Kaltix -- both acquired by Google).

I've written about the stories behind the Aster Data investment and the Transformic investment previously on my blog. In both cases, notice how my personal relationship with the founders, as well as my passionate belief in the technology, played big roles in the investment decisions.

Friends and Family or Bootstrap

This is the only option if you cannot satisfy the criteria for either VC or angel. But beware of remaining too long in this "bootstrap mode." An outside investor provides a valuable sounding board and prevents the company from becoming an echo chamber for the founder's ideas. An angel or VC can look at things with the perspective that comes from distance. Sometimes an outside investor can force something that's actually good for the founder's career: shut the company down and go do something else. That decision is very hard to make without an outside investor. My advice is to bootstrap until you can clear either the angel or the VC bar, but no longer.

Back now to Greg Linden and Findory. By my reckoning, Findory passes the team and technology tests from an angel's point of view -- if you pick an angel investor who has some passion for personalization technology. The company doesn't pass any of the VC tests. Given this, Greg should definitely have raised angel funding. My guess is that this route would likely have led to a sale of the company to one of many potential suitors: Google, Yahoo, or Microsoft, among many others. Of course, hindsight is always 20/20! I have deep respect for Greg's intellect and passion and wish him better luck in his future endeavors.

For further reading, I highly recommend Paul Graham's excellent article How to Fund a Startup.